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Abstract 
 
We argue that a ‘free’ market – that is, a market in which the state does not 
intervene – is a theoretical impossibility in a state society.  In place of the 
natural economy view of a market apart from the sate, we offer a social 
economy view of the inescapable social structuring of markets through state 
regulation.  Even when states institute policies which prevent ‘interference’ 
in a market, the enforcement power of the state is no less required.  We thus 
distinguish between two forms of regulation: negative regulation – 
regulation which prevents interference – and positive regulation – 
regulation which enables interference.  These two forms of regulation make 
possible two different conceptions of freedom, what Isaiah Berlin once 
termed ‘negative freedom’ from agency and ‘positive freedom’ to have 
agency.  We argue that positive and negative freedom and positive and 
negative regulation are inseparable; freedom is always contextual.  Through 
a discussion of the debate between industrial agriculture and 
environmentalists, we show that both supporters and critics of the ‘free’ 
market are alike in their advocacy, often unacknowledged, of both negative 
and positive forms of regulation.  Rather then a lessening of regulation, this 
debate represents the institution of a new regulatory regime out of the 
contest of interests.  We conclude by considering the implications for 
democracy of the contextual character of freedom.
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Introduction 
 
Every age has its characteristic rhetoric, its defining ideas and proverbial 
expressions, its language of motivation.  And one of the most 
characteristic bits of the rhetoric of our age is, assuredly, the ‘free 
market.’  It has become scarcely possible to read the front page without 
encountering this catchphrase and some among its many kindred terms: 
free trade, downsizing government, deregulation, private enterprise, 
competitiveness, creative destruction, efficiency.  Arrayed alongside are 
the equally familiar opposition: big government, regulation, central 
planning, bureaucracy, command-and-control, inefficiency, red tape.  
The principal opposition, however, is between the market and the state:  
By common agreement, in the words of one introductory economics 
textbook (Fischer and Dornbusch, 1983: 14), ‘markets in which 
governments do not intervene are called free markets.’   
 
We should be wary of dichotomous thinking, here and elsewhere.  While 
all concepts need points of contrast to give them their dimensions and 
make them recognisable, we must be mindful of the ideological tendency 
to erect fences and walls along the boundaries mapped by the current 
compass of our thought.  Paradoxically, in the case of the notion of the 
free market, the fences and walls have gone up under the guise of taking 
them down.  The period since the early 1980s has seen truly epochal 
changes in the social organisation of economics as old orthodoxies have 
been replaced by new ones.  Institutional structures established between 
the 1930s and 1950s in both the East and West, and their satellites in the 
South, have undergone profound, even revolutionary, revision in the past 
fifteen or so years under the banner of freeing the creative power of 
markets from the constraints of government planning and regulation.  
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The reorganisation of economies has had different components in 
different contexts--the weakening or repeal of various restrictions on 
firms, liberalisation of trade, privatisation of state-run industries, 
abandonment or modification of price controls and subsidies for various 
commodities, curbs on government expenditure, the introduction of 
market principles into the running of government itself.  The underlying 
aspiration in all these contexts was the same, however:  to ‘roll back the 
state’.  And it was informed by a common pejorative, and frequently 
uncompromising, view of regulation as state interference in the operation 
of otherwise undistorted markets.   
 
But the notion of a ‘free’ market without or prior to the state is an 
ideological abstraction.  No market is possible without a society to 
provide it with moral, legal, political, and administrative foundations.  
All markets are socially structured and socially patterned by legal codes, 
policing, norms of interaction, and common mediums for exchanging 
goods and information.  In a state society, this necessarily entails the 
state.  No form of modern market has validity apart from the state or 
states that gives it licence, scope, and regularity.  It is the state that 
guarantees the property rights, enforceable contracts, product standards, 
and sound money upon which the operation of any modern market 
depends.1  Unless by the term ‘free’ we mean a brigand economy of six-
shooters, pirates, and highwaymen, a market inherently involves the 
state.  David Marquand (1988: 101) put it well: ‘The truth is that it is as 
misleading to talk of the state ‘distorting’ the market as it would be to 
talk of the market ‘distorting’ the state.  Without the state there would be 
no market: at the door of the auction room stands the policeman.’  
Moreover, no market can exist apart from the cultural surround to which 
it adheres, and which adheres to it, giving it some normative regularity 
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and some potential for change, both of which - regularity and change - 
depend in part on the state’s structuring powers.2 
 
Indeed, even policies which roll back or prevent ‘interference’ in a 
market require state action to put them into practice and to maintain 
them.  Any new market freedoms that we may contrive - through 
deregulation, privatisation, and free trade agreements, for example - are 
inescapably the result of state power to structure and restructure 
economic and social life.   As Karl Polanyi long ago observed, it is no 
accident that the expansion of the ‘free’ market in the early nineteenth 
century was accompanied by a great expansion of the state as well: 
 
Just as, contrary to expectation, the invention of labour-
saving machinery had not diminished but actually increased 
the uses of human labour, the introduction of free markets, 
far from doing away with the need for control, regulation, 
and intervention, enormously increased their range....Thus 
even those who wished most ardently to free the state from 
all unnecessary duties, and whose whole philosophy 
demanded the restriction of state activities, could not but 
entrust the self-same state with the new powers, organs, and 
instruments required for the establishment of laissez-faire 
(Polanyi, 1944: 140-141). 
 
Free-market ideology has long wrestled, and wrestles yet, with this basic 
contradiction: that ‘freeing’ the market from the state depends upon the 
state.  But like any economic arrangement, a ‘free’ market is a social 
creation - not a force of ‘nature’ and the autonomous laws of efficient 
and adaptive production.  Again in Polanyi’s words (1944: 139), ‘There 
was nothing natural about laissez-faire; free markets could never have 
come into being merely by allowing things to take their course....Laissez-
faire itself was enforced by state action.’  Even capitalism is a social 
phenomenon. 
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Our goal in this paper is to develop a critical language for understanding 
the interrelationships between the market and the state and their social 
creation.  Of late, a growing chorus of writers has been demonstrating 
these interrelationships, arguing for the necessity of government as a 
counterweight to the market, controlling its excesses and ensuring the 
optimal allocation of resources and achievement of social goals, such as 
health, a clean environment, and social equality.  We term this argument 
the institutional critique of ‘free’ markets, perhaps best exemplified by 
the writings of Robert Kuttner (1991 and 1997).  We find the 
institutional critique very persuasive, but our goal is to go beyond it and 
follow Polanyi in the development of a constructionist critique that 
challenges the very idea of a ‘free’ market in which governments do not 
intervene. 
   
A similar distinction applies to the sociology of science.  An 
institutionalist, for example, might explore the way careerism in science 
leads scientists to choose particular topics for research over others, 
whereas a constructionist might argue that the way scientists interpret 
their results reflects the power-laden ideologies of science.  An 
institutional approach is sometimes referred to as the ‘weak’ argument 
for a sociology of science, while a constructionist argument is sometimes 
referred to as the ‘strong’ argument.  We do not accept a parallel 
language of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ critiques of the ‘free’ market, though.  
There is nothing ‘weak’ here about the institutional critique. Rather, in 
our view the institutional and constructionist critiques together make up 
two complementary sides of what we term the social economy 
perspective on the market, as opposed to the natural economy view that 
has gained such prominence of late.3   The institutional critique 
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represents a more materialist approach to social economy, while the 
constructionist critique a more idealist one.  The two are equally 
necessary; however, the constructionist approach is currently less 
developed, a situation we seek to correct in this working paper. 
 
In this paper, we also hope to correct a misconception about the state on 
the part of some authors sympathetic to a social economy point of view, 
and here we will again be rejecting the utility of the metaphor of ‘weak’ 
versus ‘strong.’  One common way to describe the economic 
reorganisation brought about by the political success of ‘free’ market 
ideology is to say that states have become ‘weaker.’  But there is nothing 
weak (or ‘small’) about the state behind the ‘free’ market.  Rather, it 
takes just as strong (and ‘big’) a state to institute a form of economic 
reorganisation as to resist it or to institute another form.  One is reminded 
here of Andrew Gamble’s characterisation of the objectives of that most 
deregulatory of administrations - that of Margaret Thatcher in 1980s 
Britain - as being ‘the free economy and the strong state’ (Gamble, 
1988).  In other words, the relationship between state and economy is not 
a question of the relative strength of a state but rather one of which 
interests dominate its control and to what ends.4       
 
We draw most of our examples from recent debates over agriculture and 
the environment, but our argument is by no means limited to these areas 
of economic policy we know best.  Our principle contribution to the 
development of the constructionist critique of the free market is more 
general - the distinction we make between two forms of state regulation: 
what we term negative regulation and positive regulation, regulation that 
prevents interference and regulation that enables interference.  Advocates 
and critics of the free market alike commonly propose both forms of 
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regulation to gain their ends, we will argue, but they seem little aware of 
it.  The philosopher R.G. Collingwood drew a distinction between 
‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ propositions (Collingwood, 1940; Krausz, 
1972).  The former tend to enjoy unquestioned status, so much so that 
those who espouse them may be unaware of their own allegiance to 
them, whereas the latter need to be continually demonstrated and 
discussed.  The absolutist character of the current mood of free-market 
abstractions, portraying markets as natural, as if beyond human agency, 
lends urgency to the relative (in Collingwood’s sense) propositions of a 
social economy view of the market.   
 
Negative Freedom and Positive Freedom 
  
Before we consider regulation, however, let us address freedom.  And 
like many others, we can think of no better place to begin to address the 
question of freedom than the work of the late Isaiah Berlin.  Indeed, our 
central theoretical distinction between negative regulation and positive 
regulation (which we will describe in more detail in the next section) 
follows Berlin’s famous distinction between ‘negative liberty’ and 
‘positive liberty.’   
  
By the phrase ‘negative liberty’ or ‘negative freedom’ (Berlin used the 
terms ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’ interchangeably)  Berlin meant ‘liberty 
from; absence of interference...’ (Berlin 1969 [1958]: 127; original 
emphasis).  As John Gray (1996: 5, 15) in his recent synthesis of Berlin’s 
work usefully defines it, negative freedom is ‘the absence of constraints 
imposed by others’ resulting in ‘unimpeded...choice among alternatives 
or options’.5  Negative freedom is freedom in John Stuart Mill’s sense, 
said Berlin, quoting Mill’s dictum that ‘The only freedom which 
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deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way’ 
(Berlin 1969 [1958]: 127).  
 
But Berlin recognised in the history of ideas another widespread 
conception of freedom, ‘the ‘positive’ conception of liberty: not freedom 
from, but freedom to - to lead one prescribed form of life...’ which 
‘derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master’ 
(Berlin 1969 [1958]: 131; our emphasis).  Gray (1995: 5) defines it as 
‘rational self-determination, or autonomy.’  This positive conception, 
said Berlin, is freedom as it was understood by Herder, Hegel, and, of 
course, Marx - a freedom to make the changes one desires.         
       
If one were to put the distinction in more sociological terms, the word 
agency would come immediately to the fore.  (So too should the word 
structure, as we will shortly see.)  Negative freedom depends upon 
freedom from agency.  Positive freedom depends upon freedom to take 
agency.  The negative freedom from agency allows me to make my own 
choices, pursuing my own good in my own way.  The positive freedom to 
take agency allows me to determine my own life-course, taking control 
over the conditions of my existence.   
 
Several important implications for the sociology of freedom follow from 
recognising that to talk of freedom is to talk of agency, but we will hold 
these to the side momentarily while we continue to explore the concept 
of freedom as political philosophers have understood it.  First, we should 
note that Berlin was well aware of something that likely has already 
occurred to some readers, and that is that in both instances of freedom, 
negative and positive, we are really talking about different sides of the 
same coin.  As Berlin (1969 [1958]: 131-132) observed, positive and 
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negative liberty are ‘no great logical distance from each other - no more 
than negative and positive ways of saying the same thing.’  In other 
words, if one is to be free of constraints imposed by others in the making 
of choices, one must be enjoying conditions that grant one some 
autonomy, and vice versa.  But although each implies the other, Berlin 
argued (convincingly, we think) that these ideas of freedom have been 
developed and applied in distinctly different ways in the history and 
politics of thought. 
 
Second, we would point out that the history and politics of thought have 
also seen a parallel debate concerning the origin and meaning of 
property.  On the one hand there has been the view, perhaps best 
exemplified by John Locke, which sees property as, to quote Bromley 
(1991: 7), ‘some immutable and timeless entitlement that can only be 
contravened with difficulty, and then only if compensation is paid by the 
state.’  For Locke, then, property was prior to the state and represented 
the absence of constraints.  Thomas Hobbes, though, saw the matter 
differently, arguing that without the Leviathan state there could be no 
property as we in our savagery would have no regard for entitlements of 
any kind.  For Hobbes, the state had to be prior to property, not least in 
bestowing the ability to seek redress for theft and other grievances of 
property.  
 
Property has long been considered in economic thought as the primary 
goal and measure of freedom.  Property in this view is the material 
manifestation of freedom.  Thus it is perhaps not surprising that debates 
over property should echo those over freedom.  We hear in the Lockean 
position strains of the negative conception of freedom in which the 
essence of property is freedom from the agency of others as embodied in 
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the state.  We hear in the Hobbesian position strains of positive freedom 
in which property depends upon our freedom to take agency over others, 
via means of the state, in defence of our property.  Therefore we suggest 
calling the Lockean view the negative conception of property, and the 
Hobbesian view the positive conception of property.6 
 
Negative Regulation and Positive Regulation 
 
But none of these - negative and positive freedom, negative and positive 
property - are possible without social action.  Freedom and property are 
social, not individual, and so too is the agency that underlies them.  
Negative freedom from agency means freedom from the agency of 
others; positive freedom to take agency means freedom to take agency 
over others.  Freedom is contextual.  As Berlin noted, quoting an old 
English aphorism,  ‘Freedom for the pike is death for the minnows’; the 
liberty of some must depend on the restraint of others.’  In other words, 
Berlin well recognised the contextual character of freedom - that freedom 
is a political matter constantly negotiated among us and involving trade-
offs between us: ‘a matter of argument, indeed of haggling,’ in Berlin’s 
words (1969 [1958]: 124).  But Berlin, a philosopher, did not follow up 
on the sociological implications of freedom’s contextual and conflictual 
character.  We do so here.   
 
After the debates of the 1980s and the writings of Giddens, Bourdieu, 
Latour, and others, it has become a sociological truism - and a correct 
one - to observe that to speak of social agency is to speak of social 
structure, each guiding and mutually constituting the other.7  If the 
liberty of some depends upon restraint of others, and over others, then 
there must be a restraining force at work.  Freedom does not exist apart 
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from constraint, nor - although this is often harder to recognise - does 
constraint exist apart from freedom, from the freedom to constrain.  Like 
all social action, freedom is socially structured; it is patterned by, just as 
it itself patterns, the actions of others.  Freedom is a product of social 
compromise, of argument and haggling, of the play of competing 
interests in setting the guidelines of action.  Freedom, then, is always 
regulated. 
 
Thus, sociologically we need to draw attention to the structural side of 
positive and negative social action, so much having already been said of 
the agency side.  We need to add two additional concepts to the 
terminology of freedom and property:  their necessary structural 
correspondences, negative regulation and positive regulation.  By 
negative regulation we mean the social structural underpinning of 
protection from the agency of others; regulation that prevents 
interference; regulation-from.  By positive regulation we mean the social 
structural underpinning necessary to take agency over others; regulation 
that enables interference; regulation-to.   
 
Our point, let us underline, is not to deny the agency side of the story and 
replace it with structure.  Just as freedom requires regulation, regulation 
requires freedom - the freedom to implement the guidelines of action.  
Rather, our point is to balance our understandings of them both. 
 
We have two main motives for seeking this balance, one sociological and 
one normative.  First, it is sociologically important to note the limited 
understanding of freedom and property which the ideologue’s abstract, 
natural economy view of the ‘free’ market affords.  The abstract view 
walls off our vision of the social construction, through regulation, of 
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freedom and property.  For the free market ideologue, true freedom is 
negative freedom, freedom-from, and true property is negative property, 
property prior to the state.  Consequently, the free marketeer, in 
challenging the role of government, typically only regards positive 
regulation as regulation.  Freedom and property are thus portrayed as 
resulting from the curtailment of the authority of government to regulate, 
particularly through bottling up the potential of the state to override the 
Lockean limits of property and impose constraints on its free enjoyment.  
For the abstract view, then, freedom and property represent the absence 
of regulation.  But recalling, with Berlin, the contextual freedom of the 
pike, we can recognise that to provide freedom from agency is also to 
regulate.  Interference must be prevented here as well, and in a state 
society that is the task of the state.  Freedom-from requires regulation-
from, just as freedom-to requires regulation-to.  But the legitimation of 
such negative regulation - legitimating, for example, the role of  the state 
in the assertion and defence of  particular forms of private property - has 
acquired the character and transparency of an absolute proposition.  
  
Second, if the above is sociologically correct, it is normatively important 
to seek a balanced view of the dialogue of freedom and regulation, of 
agency and structure.   The dominant pejorative view of positive 
regulation, though, blinds us to the social conditions that make freedom 
and property possible; it erects the high walls of dichotomy.  
Consequently, the holder of the abstract and natural view drives along in 
a private conceptual car oblivious to the social origins of the 
infrastructures - the roads, the police force, the ambulance and health 
care services, the subsidised parking, the increasingly decentralised land 
use - that make the private car both possible and attractive, and a symbol 
of our modern propertied freedoms.  But just as the motorist’s freedom 
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inflicts tyranny on others (through pollution, noise, congestion, 
accidents, and the physical isolation of the car-less), so there is always a 
trade-off between positive and negative freedoms, with the trade-off 
point at any time being set by the type of regulation prevailing.  Thus, in 
emphasising that regulation is the counterpart of freedom, our normative 
(and sociological) point is not that more regulation necessarily means 
more freedom.  Rather, our point is that the debate over the ‘free’ market 
is not really one of freedom versus regulation but instead a debate over 
particular distributions of particular regulations and thus over the 
distribution of  particular contextual freedoms among us. 
 
Regulatory Regimes 
 
In order to understand the full role of the state in the structuring of the 
market and of property, we need to employ a broad concept of what 
regulation, negative or positive, is.  In a state society, regulation - which 
we define simply as the structuring of society by the state - is 
unavoidable, as we have said.  Whatever a state does, and does not, 
structures the conditions in which its citizens live and enjoy, or do not 
enjoy, various properties of freedom and freedoms of property.  
Whatever laws a state passes or repeals or fails to pass, whatever 
bureaucratic agencies and guidelines and standards it establishes or 
removes or fails to establish, the pattern of human agency is equally 
structured by the operative policies of that state.   
 
In other words, understood sociologically, the regulatory power of a state 
is not equivalent to the length of, for example, the US Code of Federal 
Regulations - which, as of 1996, stood at 204 volumes and 132,112 
pages.  The US state does not structure its corresponding society less if 
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the code gets shorter.  The elimination of a rule, standard, or item of 
legal code represents instead a re-structuring of society, and perhaps 
certain efficiencies in drafting.  It does not necessarily indicate that 
collective freedom (assuming such an abstraction could be measured) has 
increased.  Although ideologically it may be proclaimed as deregulation, 
it is analytically an act of negative regulation, of regulation that prevents 
interference.  Deleting a statute or an item of legal code that institutes 
some form of, say, pollution prevention eliminates the positive enabling 
of certain social agents to object to the choices made by other social 
agents and substitutes it with a negative restraint.  Neighbours of a 
polluting industry will find that, without the item of code, they no longer 
have that structural means of objecting to the pollution.  One social 
agent’s freedom-to has been converted into another social agent’s 
freedom-from, enforced by the regulatory power of the state.  ‘Cutting’ 
regulations in the legal sense thus amounts to re-regulation in the 
sociological sense.    
 
It is equally a manifestation of the regulatory power of the state to fail to 
enact a particular law or bureaucratic standard to begin with.  If a 
neighbourhood organisation, perhaps linked with other like-minded 
groups, approaches a politician or official and requests the passage of a 
new restraint on pollution, it may well find itself confronted with state 
resistance to, or rejection of, its request.  That neighbourhood 
organisation thereby comes up against the social-structural reality of 
regulation-from, of negative regulation that prevents its interference in 
the ‘free’ agency of a polluter.  Its members will as well find that the 
state has structured social life such that their negative property rights, 
their rights to enjoy their property free of the agency of others, are 
compromised by the drifting of pollution from the positive property 
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rights of others - the positive right of polluters to infringe on someone 
else. 
 
The positive regulation dimension of the failure to enact a law or 
standard should not be overlooked here.  We do not mean in all instances 
to equate the absence of a line in the legal code of a country with 
negative regulation, with regulation-from.  The absence (or lack of 
enforcement) of that line is just as likely to enable certain agents to take 
agency over others, as in the drifting of pollution into another’s property, 
as it is to prevent others from taking agency over the polluter.  As with 
negative and positive freedom, negative and positive regulation directly 
imply one another.   
 
There are thus two common ideological omissions from the abstract, 
natural view of freedom and the market.  First is the failure to recognise 
negative regulation as regulation.  Second is the inability of the abstract 
view to understand that negative freedom depends not only on negative 
regulation (regulation that restricts the agency of others) but equally 
upon positive regulation (regulation that enables the constraint of 
others).  Indeed, it is worth noting that despite nearly two decades of 
government ‘down-sizing’ in the United States the length of the Code of 
Federal Regulations has increased nearly 30% from its 164 volume, 
102,195 page length in 1980, the year of Ronald Reagan’s election.8    
 
Nevertheless, understood sociologically we ought not to speak of an 
increase or decrease in regulation when a new law or standard is passed 
or an old one is dropped, nor should we speak of the decision not to pass 
a new law or standard as holding the line against Big Government.  
Rather, we should speak of the reshaping of regulatory regimes - overall 
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patterns, chaotic and contradictory as they may be, of state-sponsored 
social structures, negative and positive - out of the play of political 
interests.  As Cerny (1991: 192) suggests, 
 
The analysis of deregulation and re-regulation is of a state 
mediating between powerful opposing interests, 
deregulating here, and re-regulating there, normally trying 
to change as little as possible while adapting to limitations 
imposed by wider market or institutional/technological 
conditions, but occasionally having to impose more 
extensive changes in the balance of interests which are 
given priority or special attention. 
 
The debate over the ‘free’ market is thus not about the elimination of 
regulations and the down-sizing of governmental power, but is instead 
about the establishment of a new regulatory regime and about the 
strength of the various political interests for and against the re-
regulations it will bring.9  
 
Regulating Agriculture and the Environment 
 
The play of interests in the formation of regulatory regimes is well 
illustrated by the debate between agriculture’s industrial advocates and 
their environmental critics.  We have become accustomed to 
understanding agribusiness as advancing a negative property and 
negative freedom agenda of removing regulations and preventing 
interference.  And we have become similarly accustomed to 
understanding environmentalists as favouring positive regulation (in the 
terminology used here) that interferes with agribusiness’s otherwise 
freehand in the use of its property.  But there is no ideological purity on 
either side.  Agribusiness interests routinely lobby the state for new 
regulations, both negative regulations to structure the prevention of 
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interference and positive regulation to enable interference with the 
agency of others.  Environmentalists for their part routinely lobby for 
both positive regulations-to and, as we shall show, negative regulations-
from.     
      
One widely discussed result of the agribusiness lobby for positive 
regulation are the food disparagement laws now on the books in a 
number of US agricultural states.  These laws attracted worldwide 
attention when the Texas Cattlemen’s Association sued the popular 
television personality, Oprah Winfrey, for disparaging beef during a 
1996 show about the possibility that the BSE virus had infected some US 
cows.  The failure of the suit (pending appeal at this writing) did not 
affect the standing of Chapter 96, ‘False Disparagement of Perishable 
Food Products,’ of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code as the 
judge determined that the case could not be tried under that statute.  But 
it did highlight a contradiction between the ideology of the ‘free’ market 
as anti-regulation and the evident presence of the policeman at the door 
of the agricultural auction room. 
   
This was not an aberration.  Any agricultural market is a state-structured 
market.  To cite another US example, the expansion of industrial hog 
operations in the Midwest has depended in large measure on the passage 
of laws which restrict ‘nuisance’ lawsuits against the operations.  These 
operations, with their many tens of thousands of animals, have been the 
subject of intense debate in the 1990s.  The pungent smells, the manure 
spills, the high levels of antibiotic use, the living conditions of the 
livestock, and the economic effects on smaller farms have made large 
‘hog lots’ a potential target of many law suits by the aggrieved.  
However, under the provisions of a 1995 Iowa law, known as HF 519, if 
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a lawsuit against a hog farm is deemed a ‘nuisance’ suit, the prosecuting 
side pays the expenses of the defence, significantly limiting the 
likelihood of suits against such operations.  Indeed, that was the 
expressed intent of the legislation:  to restrict the agency of others, in this 
case potentially aggrieved neighbours.  This was a clear imposition of a 
regulation - a positive regulation, in our terminology - in support of a 
‘free’ market, but the advocates of a ‘free’ market in hogs, not 
surprisingly, did not present HF 519 in that contradictory light. 
 
The same use of positive regulation in support of ‘free’ markets, but on a 
far larger scale, underpins the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI).  Under highly secretive negotiation since September of 1995 
among the wealthiest nations of the OECD, the MAI, if enacted, would 
prevent the nations which sign on (and eventually likely any nation 
which wanted to do business with those nations) from restricting in any 
way the access of foreign capital to their markets.  As we write, the MAI 
is becoming far better known and faces an uncertain political future as 
critics point to the likely freehand the agreement would give 
multinationals, with little regard for the consequences for the poor, for 
the environment, and for localities.  But whatever its final form, if it 
indeed comes to pass at all, any such ‘freehand’ is only possible through 
state-enforced structures that restrict the agency of others and their 
ability to contest the agency of global capital.    
   
Industrial agricultural interests also advance regulatory regimes through 
the institution of negative regulations.  For example, in addition to the 
provision about ‘nuisance’ lawsuits, Iowa’s 1995 hog production law 
decreed that local governments do not have the power to regulate hog 
farms, eliminating one legal avenue that a number of areas were 
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considering taking; only the state (in the US sense of the term ‘state,’ the 
state as in the ‘State of Iowa’) has this power.  Critics argue that keeping 
this power at the level of the State of Iowa, whose legislature is currently 
controlled by the Republican Party with its Lockean view of property, 
stacked the deck of power in favour of hog lots.  Localities thus found 
that their positive freedom to take agency over industrial hog farms had 
been converted into the negative freedom from agency for these farms, 
via the higher structuring authority of state-level government.  The state 
had been called in to enforce that which ideologically was apart from the 
state:  Lockean negative property and its ‘free’ rights.  
 
However, it is not only the presence of a line of legal language in HF 519 
or some other law or code that manifests a regulatory regime.  Absence 
manifests it equally.  For example, one Iowa county, Humboldt County, 
tried to establish legal standing via a different legal avenue than the one 
HF 519 closed.  The Iowa Supreme Court eventually threw out that 
attempt on March 5, 1998, but the controversy resulted in considerable 
debate in the Iowa legislature over whether HF 519 needed to be 
superseded with a new law that allowed local regulations.  One such new 
law, HF 2145, had been proposed in 1996 but was not passed - nor was a 
law like it eventually passed in the 1998 legislative season.  But the fact 
that such a law was not passed (nor looks likely to be passed anytime 
soon) equally structures the agencies - what they can and cannot do - of 
the various parties in the controversy.  The same could be said of the 
decision of the Iowa legislature not to pass a law making the board of 
directors of an agricultural firm personally liable for damages resulting 
from a suit, such as the neighbouring state of Nebraska did pass.  The 
same could be further said of the hundreds of bills every year in 
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legislative bodies across the world which never make it ‘out of 
committee’ - or indeed never make it into committee to begin with.   
 
Environmental interests attempt to shape the regulatory regime as well.  
Nebraska’s liability law is an example of the kind of positive regulation 
we typically associate with the regulatory regime advocated by 
environmentalists:  regulations that give the public agency over the 
agency of capital.  There are, by now, countless positive environmental 
regulations, a fact which the advocates of industrial agriculture often try 
to bring to our ideological attention.  But what seems less obvious, 
though equally prevalent, are environmental arguments for negative 
regulation.  Environmentalism frequently advances a Lockean negative 
property rights position, enforced through the state, as in arguments to 
limit the spread of pollution from industry to neighbours.  To say that the 
strong anaerobic smell from the slurry lagoons of an industrial farm 
should not cross property lines or that nitrous waste or pesticide run-off 
should not enter the wells of others or the public water supply is to 
advocate the negative sanctity of property rights.   
 
A similar argument, albeit with a different notion of ownership, underlies 
the environmentalist’s wilderness advocacy.  When the environmentalist 
argues that a patch of ‘wilderness’ needs to be protected, the contention 
is, in part, that there are places where one should be able to go where the 
agency of others - other humans, at least - is not.  What is true wilderness 
but the complete absence of others’ agency, the ultimate freedom-from?  
And in a state society, such freedom-from requires corresponding 
regulation-from. 
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These freedom-from arguments on the part of environmentalists are not 
always expressed in terms of property, however.  Some issues of 
negative environmental freedom are primarily concerned with assaults on 
the person, not assaults on property (to the extent that notions of person 
and property are separable).  Why should I be compelled, the 
environmentalist also asks, to breathe, smell, drink, ingest, see, or 
otherwise absorb into my body the results of someone else’s negative 
environmental agency, eating food produced using genetically modified 
organisms or breathing air infused with the smell of hog waste?  In order 
to protect the freedom-from of the person, the environmentalist 
advocates corresponding forms of regulation-from, such as laws that 
control the drifting of the smell of hog waste, and corresponding forms 
of regulation-to, such as laws that limit the importation of food produced 
with genetically modified organisms.   Similarly, some environmental 
arguments about freedom-to are also primarily concerned with protecting 
the positive environmental freedom of the person, not property,  such as 
negative regulations that uphold the walker’s right to use ancient rights 
of way that cross a farmer’s land and positive regulations that require 
farmers to assist in the maintenance of these rights of way, on the books 
in various forms in several European countries.  But even in these 
environmental arguments about the person corresponding notions of 
property are usually close to the surface of the argument, enabling 
walkers to use another’s land and limiting the kinds of activities hog 
producers may conduct on their farms.      
  
Thus, environmental and industrial agricultural interests alike advocate 
regulatory regimes based on both negative and positive regulation.  The 
rhetoric they employ, is of course, quite different.  Industrial 
agriculture’s ‘free’ market arguments draw explicitly on the moral force 
 21 
of the Lockean, negative vision of property and freedom, while 
environmental arguments draw upon the moral force of the Hobbesian, 
positive vision.   
 
As Bromley emphasises, ‘environmental policy is nothing if not a dispute 
over the putative rights structure that gives protection to mutually 
exclusive uses of certain environmental resources’ (1993 p.3).   
 
This dispute between Lockean and Hobbesian visions of property and the 
state has some intriguing asymmetries.  One depends upon the 
geographical focus of the political debate.  At the local level, the 
argument typically runs as follows: local producers when confronted 
with pressures to tackle the environmental impacts of their activities 
argue that this will unfairly restrict their ability to trade as they will face 
costs that some of their competitors do not.  Consequently, they will be 
at a competitive disadvantage with producers elsewhere.  At the 
international level, on the other hand, global capital interests often 
portray environmental regulations and standards as local defensiveness 
against free trade, what are pejoratively referred to as ‘non-tariff trade 
barriers.’  In the local case environmental regulations are criticised for 
restricting the movement of goods out of a region, and in the 
international case environmental regulations are criticised for restricting 
the movement of goods into a region.  In this way, arguments about 
environmental externalities face a double jeopardy in relation to ‘free’ 
market arguments. 
 
Or is it triple jeopardy?  Although environmental advocates argue for 
both negative and positive regulation, as do the capital interests of 
agriculture and other industries, environmentalists must portray their 
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general position in Hobbesian terms lest they lend further legitimacy to 
the Lockean fires of ‘free’ market ideology.  But given the greater 
legitimacy the Lockean view currently holds, environmentalists thereby 
deny themselves a highly valued - if not the most valued - political 
touchstone of the day.  Consequently, environmental advocates are 
rhetorically disadvantaged with respect to capital’s oft-repeated demand 
that ‘all we want is a level playing field.’  Considering the inevitable 
interconnections between freedom and regulation, we find some 
interesting omissions in this analogy:  no one ever mentions the referee 
or the rules of the game. 
 
Dialogue, Democracy, and the Social Economy 
 
But the time has come to recognise the inevitable collapse of a polarised 
conception of the market.  Negative freedom depends upon positive 
freedom, and each depends equally upon negative regulation and positive 
regulation.  In the societies in which we live, state societies, freedom 
depends upon regulation and regulation depends upon freedom.  Each 
term represents the other’s counterpart, a point of interaction with the 
other - a dialogue of mutually constituting elements in which one 
condition of existence gives occasion to another. 
 
Berlin, as we noted earlier, was well aware of this dialogue between the 
heads of Janus.  However, he himself ultimately gave priority to negative 
freedom (and did not dwell on the sociological necessity of regulation for 
any freedom, negative or positive).  In Berlin’s reading, negative 
freedom was more pluralistic and less given to absolutist ideals and 
authoritarian politics.  Writing in the late 1950s against the background 
of the entrenched Stalinism of his native Russia and World War II’s 
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recently concluded battles with Fascism, Berlin (1969 [1958]: 171) 
argued that ‘Pluralism, with the measure of ‘negative liberty’ that it 
entails, seems to me a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of 
those who seek in the great, disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal 
of ‘positive’ self-mastery by classes, or peoples, or the whole of 
mankind.’  For Berlin (1969 [1958]: 169), the positive side of liberty 
(and thus of property and regulation) represented the dangers of 
‘monism,’ the ‘demonstrably false’ proposition that ‘some single formula 
can in principle be found whereby all the diverse ends of men can be 
harmoniously realised’.  
 
Berlin was assuredly right about the dangers of monism, of final 
solutions, of moral absolutism in a world of conflicting principles and 
priorities.  But the major threats to liberty in our day come from different 
quarters than those of the decades immediately following World War II.   
When seen against a post-Cold War background of laissez-faire 
fundamentalism and the triumphalism of global capitalism, it is clear that 
negative freedom is no more the permanent home of pluralism than 
positive freedom is not.  To speak of the ‘free’ market is to speak of the 
great absolutist project of the late 20th century, a project overweening in 
its scope, its popularity, and its monistic advocacy of negative freedom.  
Berlin was no free-marketeer, of course, but the recent successes of the 
merchants of free-market utopia have given ‘actually existing’ negative 
freedom increasingly authoritarian and hegemonic powers. 
 
What are these authoritarian and hegemonic powers?  In essence, they 
involve the assertion, extension, and defence of particular property rights 
regimes and the state-sanctioned coercive apparatus which supports 
them.  In the 19th century, free trade was imposed across much of the 
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globe through European colonialism, which involved the enforced 
commodification of natural resources through the extensive displacement 
(and sometimes the eradication) of native peoples and native political 
systems, allowing natural resources to be ‘owned’ by capital.  The 
contemporary globalisation of markets does not involve such naked 
brutality to the same extent, not least because corporate capital now 
already controls a lot of the natural resources on which it depends.  The 
changing focus of capital accumulation, though, nonetheless demands 
the constant assertion, extension, and defence of property rights and the 
regulatory regimes which instantiate them, resulting in new laws and 
treaties which, for example, enforce intellectual property rights, allow 
global capital local access, and draw boundary lines on the ocean floor 
for mining and fishing.  These all require not only state action but an 
assertive state working closely with corporate capital.   
 
The ideology of the ‘free’ market, however, falsely implies that private 
property is beyond human agency and that its defence is both socially 
neutral and benign - with no recognition of the contradiction between an 
agentless, freedom-from conception of property and its necessarily active 
defence through both regulation-from and regulation-to, all of which is 
only possible under state-structured conditions of freedom-to.  What the 
free market ideology does do, though, is to privilege certain types of 
commoditised property rights and to accord the right to trade an 
overriding and universalistic status that consigns other relations of 
production and consumption to subsidiary and particularistic positions. 
 
Enough of this privilege.  Rather than saying markets need to be either 
free or regulated, negative or positive, we need to recognise, and indeed 
encourage, the unending dialogue of these equally necessary constituents 
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of economic life.10  To repeat, every freedom-from emerges in response 
to a regulation-from and every freedom-to emerges in response to a 
regulation-from - and conversely.  As well, every freedom-from implies a 
freedom-to and every regulation-from implies a regulation-to - and 
conversely.  The Janus of the economy has more, far more, than one pair 
of faces.      
 
But although there is an essential unity in these points of contrast, we do 
need to be able to keep these forms of regulation and their corresponding 
freedoms conceptually separate.  Each constitutes the other but that does 
not mean that they are the same.  We need very much to be able to 
recognise differences and their dialogic contributions if we hope to avoid 
lapsing into the absolutism of one monism or another - into, as Mikhail 
Bakhtin would have called it, monologue.11  Our goal should be to 
collapse polarities, not difference.   
 
Let us, then, emphasise again that the goal of this paper has not been to 
advocate a more regulated society.  We do not wish to replace the current 
authoritarianism of the market and global capital with some form of state 
authoritarianism.  Rather, the ends we seek are dialogue, interactiveness, 
and the creativity they encourage in the economy and polity - as well as 
challenging the ideological and economic privilege of free-market 
absolutism.  Given the current condition of the global discussion, these 
ends have led us to try to articulate the contextual character of freedom.  
Recognising this contextuality is not to envision a totalitarian rigidity in 
social and economic life, however - quite the contrary.  Indeed, one of 
the great advantages of seeing freedom in the context of regulation (and 
regulation in the context of freedom) is that no one likes regulation 
(except, that is, for that vast bedrock of subterranean regulation on which 
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our cosseted lives so depend that we take it for granted).  We typically 
regard regulation as, at best, a necessary evil, not some transcendental 
good.  We are thus far readier to amend some particular conception of 
regulation than some conception of freedom, opening up our 
imaginations and our futures. 
 
Understanding the regulatory requisites of freedom also opens up our 
politics.  The claim that freedom is best attained by ‘down-sizing’ the 
state is really about down-sizing democracy.  By identifying the ‘free’ 
market with the removal and absence of regulation, advocates divert 
attention, whether deliberately or not, from the constraints that market 
freedoms impose and are imposed by.  For every regulation the ‘free’ 
market taketh away it giveth one in return, often unnoticed until after the 
event.  
 
To conclude, our point is not that markets do not or should not exist.  
Rather, it is that the shape markets take inevitably depend on the 
structures we provide for them.  And it is just such structured markets, 
such regulated freedoms, that can lead to a truly social economy, but 
only when they are structured by commitment to democratic debate.  
When we break those commitments, we lose that freedom.  The biggest 
problem with the rhetoric of the ‘free’ market is the way it diverts our 
attention from that loss.  For it is not the markets that we want to be free, 
but ourselves to restructure the context of freedom itself. 
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Notes
 
1
 We are indebted to Lawrence Busch (personal communication) for pointing out to us 
the importance of product standards and commodity grading systems in the state 
structuring of the market.  
2
 The cultural dimensions of the market is a topic we, for reasons of focus, do not 
much discuss here, except to the extent that this whole paper represents a critique of  
free-market ideology.  For detailed investigations of  these cultural dimensions, see 
Bell (1998a and 1998b) and Ray (1997).  
3
 The debates between constructionists and realists in environmental sociology and 
between the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ approaches to the sociology of science have 
distracted much scholarly effort.  Indeed, these debates are themselves emblematic of 
the dichotomous and polarising mode of thought that we critique with regard to the 
relationship between the market and the state.  For an argument for a more interactive 
view of how to handle conceptual distinctions, see the discussion in Bell (1998b) of 
‘ecological dialogue.’   
4
 Some states are stronger relative to other states, however, as opposed to relative to 
the market.  Indeed, ‘strong’ states in this sense may impose ‘free’ market regimes on 
‘weaker’ states, such as happened in many developing countries and former socialist 
countries.  Much of this imposition has occurred through interstate action involving a 
kind of transnational pooling of sovereignty through such bodies as the European 
Union, the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank, and so on.  On the notion of 
an emerging ‘global state’ above the level of the national state, see McMichael 
(1994).  In other words, the ‘state’ is a far more complex category than we have room 
to explicate here.    
5
 Gray’s (1996: 15) precise phrase is ‘choice among alternatives or options that is 
unimpeded by others’; original emphasis.  We have altered it to avoid repetition with 
the previous quotation from Gray. 
6
 Not everyone associates Hobbes with the ‘positive’ position.  For a contrary view, 
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see Gray (1996).  Bromley (1991) sets the Lockean negative view against the writings 
of Kant who saw society and property as mutually constitutive, a more sociological 
view that is close to that of Durkheim and to what we advance here. 
7
 Bourdieu, in fact, claims to have moved past the distinction between structure and 
agency altogether with his notions of ‘field’ and ‘habitus,’ but we feel that the 
strength of Bourdieu’s concepts is the way they unite structure and agency; we do not 
accept that he has eliminated the need for the distinction.  In fact, without the concepts 
of structure and agency in the back of one’s mind, it is hard to appreciate the value of 
the concepts of ‘field’ and ‘habitus.’  See Bourdieu (1977) and Bourdieu and 
Wacquant (1992).    
8
 To be precise, the increase between 1980 and 1996 was 29.3%.  The length of the 
Code did drop slightly between 1996 and 1995, though, as it also did between 1981 
and 1982, 1984 and 1985, and 1990 and 1991 (Office of the Federal Register figures).  
9
  See, for example, Cloke and Le Heron (1994); Flynn, Marsden, and Ward (1994). 
10
 We note here a striking correspondence between Berlin’s caution’s against the 
search for a ‘single formula’ for living and the support of Bakhtin, from whom we 
draw much of the epistemological foundation of this paper, for the ‘unfinalisability’ of 
dialogue. 
11
 For Bakhtin’s account of the dangers of ‘monologue,’ see especially Bakhtin 
(1986).  
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